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Illegitimacy and Intestate Succession:
White v. Randolph
At early common law an illegitimate child was considered to befilius
nullius-a child of no one and thus unable to inherit.' This early rule was
first relaxed in 1824 in Heath v. White,2 in which illegitimate children were
granted full inheritance rights from their mother. Most states by statute
now have placed illegitimate children on a par with legitimate children in
inheritance from the mother. In many of these states, however, barriers
still deny illegitimate children full inheritance rights from the father.4
The rationale advanced in American jurisdictions for discrimination
against illegitimate children has changed little over the years.5 Many states
1L W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND* 485 (1857).
2. 5 Conn. 228 (1824).
3. Forty-nine of the fifty states have such statutes. See ALA. CODE § 43-3-7 (1975); ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.11.045 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2109 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(d) (1947); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 255 (West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-109(b) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §45-
274(b)(1) (Vest 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108 (West 1980);
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-904 (1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 532-6 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-109 (1949);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (Burns 1972); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633.221 (Vest 1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 391.090 (1970); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109 (1979); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-208 (1974); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 190, § 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1969); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 702.81(1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 525.172 (West 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.060 (Vernon
1956); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-6-104 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. §
134.170 (1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 561.4,561.5 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-109 (1978); N.Y.
EST., POwRs & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (1976); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-04-09 (1979); OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 2105.17 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215
(Vest 1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 112.105 (1979); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107 (Purdon 1980); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 33-1-8 (1956); S.C. CODE § 21-3-30 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-1-15 (1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-114 (1977); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. art. 42 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §
75-2-109 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (1974); VA. CODE § 64.1-5.1 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 11.04.081 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 42-1-5 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 852.05 (West 1980); Wyo.
STAT. § 2-4-107 (1977). Louisiana has not placed illegitimate children completely on a par with
legitimate children in inheritance from the mother. See LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 918 (West 1967).
4. Many state statutes simply do not include illegitimate children within the definition of
children as used in inheritancestatutes when the decedent is a man, except under certain circumstances.
See ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.045 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2109 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-
141(d) (1947); CAL. PROB. CODE § 255 (West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT § 15-11-109(b) (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45-274(b)(1) (West 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
732.108 (Vest 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-904 (1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 577-14 (1976); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (Burns 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §
633.222 (West 1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 391.090 (1970); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 919 (West 1967); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109 (1979); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. § 1-208 (1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 190, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1969); MICH. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 702.83 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.172 (West 1975): Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15 (1972);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.070 (Vernon 1956); NEV. REv. STAT. § 134.170 (1966); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.105
(1979); S.C. CODE § 21-3-20,21-3-30 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-1-15 (1976); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 31-114 (1977); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. art. 42 (Vernon 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553
(1974); Wyo. STAT. § 2-4-107 (1977).
5. Maintenance of the family institution is the rationale most often advanced for discrimination
against illegitimates. See Note, From Levy to Robins: Equal Protection for Adulterous Illegitimates, 3
So. U.L. REv. 287, 292 (1977).
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and the federal government freely enacted legislation that denied illegiti-
mate children the right to support, inheritance, and other benefits afforded
to legitimate children. 6 Because illegitimate children had few vocal propo-
nents of their rights, there was a lack of remedial legislation.7 Prior to 1968,
the United States Supreme Court had not tested the equal protection
validity of statutory classifications based on legitimacy. Since 1968, how-
ever, state courts, lower federal courts, and the United States Supreme
Court have heard many cases challenging the constitutionality of legiti-
macy classifications.8
Ohio's statutes have not been immune from equal protection attack.
This Comment concerns the most recent attack on Ohio's intestate succes-
sion statutes, which classify potential heirs on the basis of legitimacy.
White v. Randolph9 is the first instance in which the Ohio Supreme Court
considered the validity of the intestate succession statute since the United
States Supreme Court first applied equal protection analysis to legitimacy
classifications. This Comment concerns the illegitimate child's right to
inherit from his intestate father. Its purpose is to explore the constitution-
ality of Ohio's intestate succession statute in its treatment of illegitimate
children, and to comment on the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in White
v. Randolph.
I. STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
The Warren Court developed two analytical frameworks that could
be applied when determining the validity of a statutory classification under
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.'0 The lower tier of this two-
tier system consists of the rational basis test, under which a challenged
classification denies equal protection only if the classification is irrelevant
to the legislative goals." The determination of validity requires three steps.
6. See Social Security Act, § 202(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
23:1232 (West 1964) (workmen's compensation benefits).
7. Stenger, The Supreme Court and Illegitimacy: 1968-1977, 11 FAM. L. Q. 365, 400 (1977).
8. See, e.g., Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975); Watts v. Veneman, 476 F.2d 529 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Severance v. Weinberger, 362 F. Supp. 1348 (D.D.C. 1973); Strahan v. Strahan, 304 F.
Supp. 40 (W.D.La. 1969), affd, 444 F.2d 528 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 949 (1971); In reEstate of
Ginochio, 43 Cal. App. 3d 412, 117 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1974); In re Estate of Caldwell, 247 So. 2d I (Fla.
1971); Pettiford v. Frazier, 226 Ga. 438, 175 S.E.2d 549 (1970); In re Estate of Karas, 61 Ill.2d 40, 329
N.E.2d 234(1975); Burnettv. Camden, 253 Ind. 354,254 N.E.2d 199, rehearing denied, 255 N.E.2d 650,
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 901 (1970); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 531 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1975), vacated, 431
U.S. 911 (1977); In re Estate of Breole, 287 Minn. 556, 178 N.W.2d 896, appeal dismissed sub-nom.
Kostamo v. Northern City Nat'l Bank, 402 U.S. 902 (1970), rehearing denied, 402 U.S. 1013 (1971); In
re Estate of Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1970), appeal dismissed sub-nom. Hietala v.
Pakarinen, 402 U.S. 903 (1971); In re Estate of Thompson, 136 N.J. Super. 412, 346 A.2d 442 (Passiac
County Ct. 1975); In re Will of Flemm, 85 Misc. 2d 855,381 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sur. Ct. 1975); In Re Estate
of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968); Young v. Willis, 436 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. App. 1968); Wells v.
Hames, 464 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
9. 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, 391 N.E.2d 333 (1979).
10. "No state shall ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
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First, the Court must identify the trait that forms the basis of the classifica-
tion. Second, it must determine the purpose behind the classification.
Finally, the court must scrutinize the relationship between the trait and the
purpose. 12 Application of the rational basis test ensures, in the majority of
cases, that the statute will be upheld since some legitimate purpose can be
rationalized for almost any classification. 3 In fact, from 1937 to 1970 the
challenged classifications were upheld in all but one case14 in which the
Supreme Court applied the traditional rational basis test.
The second tier of the original two-tier system of equal protection
analysis consists of the strict scrutiny test, which is reserved for cases
dealing with suspect classifications-such as race, alienage, and national
origin15 -or fundamental rights-such as the right to privacy. 6 When this
test is applied, the court does not defer to the legislature's judgment
concerning the statute's goals and the challenged classification's relation-
ship to those goals. Instead it independently determines the degree of
relationship that the classification bears to a constitutionally compelling
goal.1 7 For the classification to survive, the court must find it necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest.18 Review under this test is so
strict that it is difficult for the classification to survive. Prior to the Burger
Court, the challenged classification was upheld in only one case' 9 out of
several in which the strict scrutiny test was applied.
One of the fundamental differences in the application of the tradition-
al rational basis test and the strict scrutiny test is the assignment of the
burden of proofL20 When a court applies the traditional rational basis test,
the challenged classification is presumed to be valid. The challenger must
show that the classification bears no reasonable relation to a legitimate
purpose. No presumption of validity, however, is afforded the classifica-
tion when a court applies the strict scrutiny test. The supporter of the
challenged classification must show a compelling state interest that justi-
fies the discrimination. 2
12. Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 FORDHAM L.
REv. 605, 606-07 (1973).
13. Lorio, Succession Rights of Illegitimates in Louisiana, 24 LOYOLA L. REV. 1, 10 (1978).
14. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled, New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
15. Suspect classifications include race, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), alienage, see
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and national origin, see Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948).
16. Fundamental personal rights include the right to procreate, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942), free exercise of religion,see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), privacy in marital
decision, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), freedom of political association, see
William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), freedom of interstate travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), and the right to terminate pregnancy, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (1978).
18. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
19. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
20. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 420 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
21. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967). See also Note, Paternal Inheritance Rights of
Illegitimate Children and the Problem of Proving Paternity, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1389, 1394 (1978).
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Both tests in the two-tier equal protection analysis deal with the
determination of the government's purpose in making the challenged
classification. This determination is made differently for the two tests.
Under the traditional rational basis test, a court hypothesizes all possible
purposes behind the classification. Each possible purpose and related
interest is then tested according to the appropriate level of relationship,
and the finding of one purpose satisfying the appropriate relationship is
22
sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the classification. Under
strict scrutiny analysis, a court searches for the one motivating purpose of
the classification accepting not necessarily the legislature's stated purpose
as the motivating purpose of the statute.23
Since the development of the two-tier equal protection analysis, some
have questioned whether the Court actually continues to follow the dichot-
omy. The Burger Court appears to have changed the focus in equal
protection cases. It has struck down some statutes to which application of
the rational basis test would have resulted in a finding of validity, although
24
the Court evidently was not applying strict scrutiny. Thus, it appears that
the Court applied neither of the two traditional tests and that a middle level
test had developed within the Court's equal protection analysis.25
The Court's analysis in sex discrimination cases is one example of the
application of a middle level of scrutiny. In Reed v. Reed,26 the Court
found that a sex "classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation.' ,27 Sex was not found to be a suspect classifica-
tion like race and therefore the classification did not have to satisfy the
strict scrutiny test. The test applied in Reed, however, was not the tradi-
tional rational basis test. The Court required more than a mere rational
relationship between the challenged classification and the classification's
purpose; the relationship had to be "substantial" to satisfy the Court.
Unlike application of the traditional rational basis test, the Court imposed
an affirmative duty on the party defending the classification to demon-
strate the required relationship between the classification and the pur-
ported purpose.
22. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961), in which the Court stated: "A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it." See also Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1077-81 (1969).
23. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in which the Court rejected the state's contention
that the statute prohibiting interracial marriage was based on scientific evidence on the advisability of
such marriages.
24. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Powell, J.
concurring); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
25. Lorio, supra note 13, at 11.
26. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
27. Id. at 76.
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Justice Marshall, in dissenting opinions in a number of cases, 28 has
developed his own theory of how the Court actually analyzes equal
protection cases. He contends that the court "has applied a spectrum of
standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal
Protection Clause., 2 9 According to Justice Marshall, the intensity of the
Court's scrutiny depends upon the importance of the interest threatened by
the classification, balanced against the effectiveness of the classification in
achieving its purpose and the importance of those purposes. Marshall
suggests that the use of this sliding scale approach has been particularly
evident in the Court's decisions concerning illegitimate children.3 °
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLIED
To LEGITIMACY CLASSIFICATIONS
A. Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has never explicitly denoted illegitimacy as a
suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny. Some commentators inter-
preted the Court's opinion in Levy v. Louisiana,31 the first of the recent line
of cases concerning illegitimacy, as indicating that illegitimacy was a
suspect classification.32 The Court at one point in Levy appears to equate
illegitimacy with race, a suspect classification, in stating that, in the past, it
has "not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it
had history and tradition on its side. 33 In the past, racial classifications
have been struck down although the challenged classification had history
and tradition on its side.3a
The issue in Levy was whether an illegitimate child could bring a
wrongful death action for the death of his mother. The Court analyzed the
case as one concerning interference with the family relationship, and those
interpreting Levy as indicating that illegitimacy was a suspect classifica-
tion found support in the statement by the Court that, in the past, the
Court has "been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil
28. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-109 (1973) (Marshall, J.
dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1971) (Marshall, J. dissenting); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
29. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J. dissent-ing).
30. Id. at 108-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
32. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1127 n.281 (1969);
Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1969); Krause, Legitimate
and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity,
36 U. CHi. L. REV. 338 (1969); 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 135, 138 (1968); 34 Mo. L. REV. 271,272(1969); 47
TEx. L. REV. 326, 329 (1969).
33. 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
34. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
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rights. . . . The rights asserted here involve the intimate familial relation-
ship between a child and his own mother. 35 Thus, the Court came close to
designating a family relationship a fundamental right, which would be
protected by the application of the strict scrutiny test.
The Court's failure to provide any real constitutional analysis in Levy
provided room for speculation on the application of strict scrutiny. It must
be noted, however, that other language in the Levy opinion points to the
application of the rational basis test, and in retrospect, it appears the Court
did apply a less stringent test.
36
Following Levy, a plea for application of the strict scrutiny test was
made in most illegitimacy cases presented to the Court. The Court, how-
ever, soon put an end to any speculation on the application of the test. In
Mathews v. Lucas" and Trimble v. Gordon,38 the Court explicitly refused
to hold illegitimacy a suspect classification. The Court in Lucas stated that
although illegitimacy, like race, is a trait not within the control of the child,
discrimination against illegitimate children has not been as severe as that
against blacks. 39 The Trimble court reaffirmed the position taken in Lu-
cas.
40
B. The Other Extreme: Deferral to the Legislature
The lowest standard of review applied by the Supreme Court to a
legitimacy classification appeared in Labine v. Vincent.41 In Labine, an
illegitimate child attacked the constitutionality of a state intestate succes-
sion law that barred an illegitimate child from sharing equally with legiti-
mate children in the estate of the father. In upholding the constitutionality
of the statute, the Court applied a level of review less restrictive than even
the traditional rational basis test.42 The Court simply deferred to the state
prerogative to regulate the disposition of property at death, and the state
power to establish, protect, and strengthen family life.43 There was no
35. 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
36. The Levy court stated: "Though the test has been variously stated, the end result is whether
the line drawn is a rational one." Id.
37. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
38. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
39. The court stated that:
[W]hile the law has long placed the illegitimate child in an inferior position relative to the
legitimate in certain circumstances, particularly in regard to obligations of support or other
aspects of family law, perhaps in part because the roots of the discrimination rest in the
conduct of the parents rather than the child, and perhaps in part because illegitimacy does not
carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, this discrimination against illegitimates has never
approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination
against women and Negroes.
427 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1976) (citation omitted).
40. 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977).
41. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
42. See Note, Mathews v. Lucas: A Setback in the Illegitimate's Quest for Equality Under the
Law, 16 J. FAM. L. 37, 43 (1978); 52 TUL. L. REV. 406, 408 (1978); 23 ViLL. L. RE. 405, 409 (1978).
43. [T]he power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life as well as to
regulate the disposition of property left in Louisiana by a man dying there is committed by the
Constitution of the United States and the people of Louisiana to the legislature of that State.
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inquiry into the relationship between the state's purpose and the legitimacy
classification. The Court did state that if the rational basis test was applied
to the case, the statute would be found valid." Cases other than Labine
also contain deference language.45 These cases, however, take the addition-
al step of inquiring into the relationship between the state's purpose and
the classification.46
C. Development of the Rational Basis Test: Levy to Trimble
The history of equal protection review of legitimacy classifications
from Levy to Trimble demonstrates that there has been a blurring of the
traditional two-tier equal protection analysis. In Levy, the Court con-
cluded that illegitimacy had no relation to the purpose of the statute, but
did not articulate a standard by which the classification could be measured
in the future.47 Instead, the Court held that the statute was invalid merely
because it was "invidious to discriminate against [illegitimate children]
when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant" to the
purpose of the statute.48
In Levy's companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability
Insurance Company,49 the Louisiana wrongful death statute was chal-
lenged, but for a reason slightly different than that advanced in Levy. The
statute did not permit the mother of an illegitimate child to recover for the
wrongful death of the child. As in Levy, the challenged classification was
found to be invalid because there existed no possible rational relationship
between the classification and the purpose of the statute. Like Levy, Glona
contained limited constitutional analysis on which to base future applica-
tion. Both Levy and Glona resulted in inconsistent lower court cases. °
Four years after Levy, in 1972, as a result of in-depth constitutional
Absent a specific constitutional guarantee, it is for the legislature, not the life-tenured judges
of this Court, to select from among possible laws.
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1971).
44. Id. at 536 n.6.
45. In Matthews v. Lucas the court stated:
Our role is simply to determine whether Congress' assumptions are so inconsistent or
insubstantial as not to be reasonably supportive of its conclusions that individualized factual
inquiry in order to isolate each nondependent child in a given class of cases is unwarranted as
an administrative exercise. In the end, the precise accuracy of Congress' calculations is not a
matter of specialized judicial competence; and we have no basis to question their detail
beyond the evident consistency and substantiality.
427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976). In Trimble v. Gordon the court stated: "Absent infringement of a constitu-
tional right, the federal courts have no role here, and, even when constitutional violations are alleged,
those courts should accord substantial deference to a State's statutory scheme of inheritance." 430 U.S.
762, 771 (1977).
46. See text accompanying notes 59-60 and 66-67 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
48. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
49. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
50. See Munnv. Munn, 168 Colo. 176,450 P.2d 68 (1969); In re Estate of Pakarinen, 287 Minn.
330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1970); R. v. R., 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968); In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d
861 (N.D. 1968); Storm v. None, 57 Misc. 2d 342, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Fam. Ct. 1968).
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analysis, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,51 produced a test of
validity that could easily be applied to future cases. In this case the
Louisiana workmen's compensation statute was attacked. Under the
Louisiana law,52 illegitimate children were not considered within the class
of "children" for whom benefits could be forthcoming, but were relegated
to a lesser status. According to Weber, a court should ask: "What legiti-
mate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental
personal rights might the classification endanger?"53 The degree of impor-
tance of the state interest should be balanced against the personal rights
involved. If the state interest is important and the personal rights involved
are not fundamental, the challenged classification should be upheld.
Because it considers factors other than the state's interest, such as
endangered fundamental rights, this balancing test is more than a mere
application of the traditional rational basis test. Although it includes a
consideration of fundamental rights, the balancing test falls short of the
strict scrutiny test because the balancing factor could theoretically weigh in
favor of the state even without a compelling state interest. The Weber
Court also found that there was "no significant relationship to those
recognized purposes" of the statute.54 The Weber test, stated this way,
appears very similar to the middle level scrutiny applied in Reed. The term
"significant" used in Weber could mean the same as the phrase "fair and
substantial," as used in Reed.55
In Mathews v. Lucas, decided in 1974, the Court indicated that it was
applying the Weber balancing test.56 The challenged classification in Lucas
arose from provisions of the Social Security Act. These provisions"7 placed
conditions on the eligibility of certain illegitimate children for a surviving
child's insurance benefits that were not placed on legitimate children. The
Court reviewed in detail the relationship between the statutory classifica-
tion and its asserted purpose, thus indicating that the Court was using a
heightened level of review. The challenged classification, however, was
found to be permissible, indicating that the test applied provided the
illegitimate child with virtually no more protection than that provided by
the traditional rational basis test. The Court, in fact, may have applied the
traditional rational basis test; it stated that "the statutory classifications
are permissible . . . because they are reasonably related to the likelihood
of dependency at death. 58 The Court, showing more deference than had
51. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
52. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1232 (Vest 1964).
53. 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1976).
54. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
55. Comment, Paternity Statutes Thwarting Equal Protection for Illegitimates, 32 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 339, 345-49 (1977).
56. 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976).
57. Social Security Act, § 202(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 402 (d)(3) (1970).
58. 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976).
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been afforded in previous cases, accepted without inquiry the govern-
ment's characterization of the statutory purpose. 59 In addition, the govern-
ment was required to show only that the result of the classification approx-
imated, rather than precisely mirrored, the results that a case-by-case
determination would reach.60
Whatever confusion existed after Weber and Lucas, it appeared clear
after the Court's 1977 decision in Trimble v. Gordon that the Court no
longer exclusively applied the two-tier equal protection analysis, and that
classifications based on legitimacy were to be examined more closely than
under the traditional rational basis test. Trimble concerned the Illinois
intestate inheritance statute, which precluded illegitimate children from
inheriting from their father. The test employed in Trimble contained three
steps: identification of the objectives of the statute; determination of the
correlation between the objectives and the means; and scrutiny of the
legitimacy of the stated objectives. 6
When identifying the objectives of the statute, the Trimble Court
clearly indicated that it was not going to hypothesize about the motivating
62purposes behind the challenged classification. A mere incantation of a
proper state purpose by one of the parties to the case was found insufficient
by the Court. 63 The only state objectives considered by the Court in
Trimble were those objectives identified by the Illinois Supreme Court as
the actual purposes of the statute. In fact, the Court explicitly refused to
consider a purpose espoused by a party because the Illinois court did not
64find that purpose to be one behind the statute. Thus, the first step in the
Trimble test neither resembled the traditional rational basis test, in which
the Court considers all possible purposes supporting the classification, nor
fully resembled the traditional strict scrutiny test, in which the Court
makes an independent determination of the purpose behind the classifica-
tion.65
In the second step of the Trimble test-the determination whether
there is a correlation between the objectives and the means-the Court
explored alternative means to achieve the purposes of the classification in
order to evaluate whether the legislature had available other feasible
alternatives. According to the Court, if feasible alternatives are available,
and the means under review are imperfect-either over- or under-
inclusive-the Court must then decide what degree of imperfection is
permissible, the degree of permissible imperfection depends upon the
59. Id. at 507.
60. Id. at 509.
61. 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 823, 825 (1978).
62. 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977).
63. Id. at 769.
64. Id. at 775-76.
65. See text accompanying note 22-23 supra.
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degree of infringement upon an important right.66 This second step in the
Trimble test differs from the traditional rational basis test in that it calls for
consideration of alternatives available to the legislature. The Trimble test
also differs from traditional strict scrutiny, since it does not require the
selection of the best possible means, only that the means be within the
range appropriate to the importance of the rights involved. The Court in
Trimble concluded by restating the holding of Lucas: that the statute must
be "carefully tuned to alternative considerations."67
Thus, it appears that Trimble and the line of illegitimacy cases leading
to it are a part of the growing number of middle ground equal protection
cases, 68 reflecting the Burger Court's dissatisfaction with the Warren
Court's rigid two-tier approach.69
D. Purpose of Legitimacy Classifications
One of the major purposes behind legitimacy classifications is encour-
agement of legitimate family relationships through marriage. Those con-
cerned with this purpose claim that if the state provided the illegitimate
child with all the rights of a legitimate child there would be no other
encouragement for the parties to marry. 70 The rights of legitimate family
relationships include the rights to support,7 ' to bring a wrongful death
action,72 to workmen's compensation,73 to social security benefits,74 and to
intestate succession from the father.75 As far as intestate succession is
concerned, the rationale of promoting legitimate family relationships
ignores the fact that often the relevant inheritance statute permits the
father to include the illegitimate child in his will, and fails to explain why,
in most states, the illegitimate child is permitted to inherit from the
intestate mother.76
In Labine,77 Weber,78 and Trimble7 9 the Court recognized the state's
66. See text accompanying notes 70-88 supra for a discussion on imperfection of means.
67. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976).
68. See Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A
Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 971, 1006 (1974).
69. See Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfora
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
70. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477, 493 (1967).
71. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
72. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,391 U.S.
73 (1968).
73. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
74. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
75. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
76. Krause, supra note 70, at 494.
77. In Labine, the court stated that"the power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen
family life .. . is committed by the Constitution of the United States and the people of Louisiana to
the legislature of the State." 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
78. In Weber, the court stated:
The Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized strongly the State's interest in protecting "legiti-
mate family relationships," and the regulation and protection of the family unit have indeed
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interest in promoting legal family relationships as a legitimate statutory
purpose. In Labine, in which the state intestate succession law prevented
illegitimate children from sharing equally with legitimate children in the
estate of the father, the Court concluded that the statutory classification
was rationally related to the state's interest in encouraging family life and
was therefore constitutional.80 In Weber, however, when the state work-
men's compensation statute relegated illegitimate children to a lesser
position than legitimate children in recovery of benefits, the Court found
that although promoting family life was a legitimate purpose, the legiti-
macy classification did not sufficiently serve that purpose.81 The chal-
lenged classification in Trimble, like Labine, concerned an intestate suc-
cession statute that did not permit an illegitimate child to inherit from his
intestate father on the same basis as a legitimate child. Unlike Labine,
however, the Trimble Court agreed with Weber and found that the classifi-
cation did not sufficiently afford realization of the purpose. 2
Intimately connected with the interest of promoting legitimate family
relationships is the state's interest in discouraging promiscuity. Although
this interest might be a valid exercise of the state's power to regulate the
moral behavior of its citizens, the Court in Weber denounced the relation-
ship between the classification and this state interest. The potential parents
would not be dissuaded from engaging in illicit sexual activity by fear that
any resulting illegitimate children would not be given the same rights as a
legitimate child. 83 This criticism applies equally to the state interest in
promoting legitimate family relationships.
Another rationale underlying most intestate succession laws is the
presumed intent doctrine of inheritance; in the absence of a will expressing
the desires of the decedent, the state must create a plan of distribution that
follows as closely as possible the presumed desires of decedents in general! 
4
In Labine and Trimble, the challenged classifications placed illegitimate
children in disadvantageous positions as compared to legitimate children
been a venerable state concern. We do not question the importance of that interest; what we
do question is how the challenged statute will promote it.
406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
79. In Trimble, the court stated: "No one disputes the appropriateness of Illinois' concern with
the family unit, perhaps the most fundamental social institution ofoursociety. The flaw in the analysis
lies elsewhere." 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
80. 401 U.S. 532, 537-38 (1971).
81. 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
82. 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
83. The court in Weber stated:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation ofirrespon-
sible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an
infant is illogical and unjust. . . .Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and
penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the
parent.
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
84. See generally, Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisia-
na and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 118 U. PA. L. RaV. 1 (1969); 23 Aa. JuR. 2d
Descent and Distribution § 10 (1965).
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in intestate succession from the child's father. It was argued in Trimble that
the purpose behind the classification was to reflect the presumed desires of
the decedent.85 This argument may have some merit. When it appears that
the father has little or no relationship with the illegitimate child beyond the
obligation of support, it seems reasonable to presume that the father would
not want his illegitimate children to take a share of his estate, especially
when this share would lessen the shares of his spouse and legitimate
children. When, however, the father lives with the illegitimate child in a
family relationship, as was the case in Trimble, the presumed intent
rationale is not persuasive. This argument, however, was not passed on by
the Trimble Court because, although presented to the Court, presumed
intent was not considered as one of the purposes behind the classification.6
If the Court had addressed the argument, the relationship between the
presumed intent theory and the classification would probably not have
been sufficient to uphold the statute since the statute did not take into
consideration situations in which the classification made was obviously
not the decedent's intent.87
The Court has recognized administrative convenience as a legitimate
state purpose justifying legitimacy classifications. In Lucas, a Social
Security provision was challenged as a violation of equal protection, as
embodied in the fifth amendment due process clause. Under the challenged
Social Security provision, a child was entitled to surviving child's benefits
if the child was dependent on the father at the time of the father's death.
Legitimate children and certain illegitimate children were relieved of the
burden of proving dependency. The statute was upheld because it pro-
moted the government's interest in administrative convenience.
Such presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may
approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case
adjudication would show, are permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so
long as that lack of precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of
substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny. 88
Other possible means of avoiding a case-by-case determination of depen-
dency were not considered by the Court.
85. 430 U.S. 762, 774 (1977).
86. Id. at 775.
87. The Court states that: "At least when the disadvantaged group has been a frequent target of
discrimination, as illegitimates have, we doubt that a State constitutionally may place the burden on
that group by invoking the theory of 'presumed intent:' " Id. at 775 n.16.
88. 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976). The Court continued:
Under the standard of review appropriate here, however, the materiality of the relation
between the statutory classifications and the likelihood of dependency they assertedly reflect
need not be "scientifically substantiated." Nor, in any case, do we believe that Congress is
required in this realm of less than strictest scrutiny to weigh the burdens of administrative
inquiry solely in terms of dollars ultimately "spent," ignoring the relative amounts devoted to
administrative rather than welfare uses.
Id. at 510.
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E. Intestate Succession: Purpose of Legitimacy Classifications
Although presumed intent has been suggested as the purpose behind
illegitimacy classifications in intestate succession statutes,89 the main
purpose behind these classifications is probably the administrative con-
venience doctrine of Lucas. The state has an interest in establishing an
efficient method of property disposition at death. When illegitimate child-
ren attempt to inherit from the intestate father, there is the significant
problem of proving paternity, and as a result there is the possibility of a
large number of spurious claims. 90 A case-by-case determination of pater-
nity after the death of the father would delay the settlement of estates.
Thus, for the sake of administrative convenience, the states have estab-
lished classifications in which some children automatically inherit from the
deceased, and some do not. This problem of proving paternity appears to
be the only remaining barrier to absolute equality for the illegitimate child
in father-child intestate succession legislation.9
Statutory methods of proving paternity were considered in Labine,
Gomez, and Trimble. The constitutionality of Louisiana's intestate inheri-
tance law was challenged in Labine v. Vincent. Louisiana law barred an
illegitimate child from sharing equally with legitimate children in the
intestate property of their father. Although a public acknowledgement of
the child by the father was sufficient to give the child a claim for support
from the father and the capacity to be a limited beneficiary under a will left
by the father, it provided the child with only the limited right to inherit
from an intestate father to the exclusion of the state.92 An acknowledge-
ment of the child coupled with a statement by the father that he wishes to
legitimate the child was sufficient under Louisiana law to provide an
illegitimate child with the full benefit of intestate inheritance. 93 But in the
case before the Court, the father had not made such a statement. This
intestate succession scheme was upheld by the Court. The Court did not
discuss what other methods of proving paternity the state can require
besides those found valid in Louisiana's law.
Following Labine, the Court next dealt with the problems of proving
paternity in the 1973 decision of Gomez v. Perez.94 The case, however, did
not concern an intestate succession statute. The challenged statute granted
legitimate children a judicially enforceable right to support from the
natural father, but denied this right to illegitimate children. The law
precluded an illegitimate child from the opportunity to prove that he was
89. See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
90. See generally H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 105-60 (1971); Krause,
Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477, 489 (1967).
91. 52 TUL. L. REv. 406, 413 (1978).
92. 401 U.S. 532, 533 (1971).
93. Id. at 539.
94. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
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the biological child of the father, as the child in Gomez attempted to do.95
The statute was found to be unconstitutional because it denied the child
equal protection. Recognizing the problems of proving paternity, the
Court stated that such "problems are not to be lightly brushed aside, but
neither can they be made into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield
otherwise invidious discrimination.
9 6
The Court, in 1977, once again handled paternity proof problems in
connection with intestate succession statutes, in Trimble v. Gordon, in
which the Illinois Probate Act97 was the subject of attack. The Illinois law
permitted illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from the
mother, but not from the father. Legitimate children could inherit by
intestate succession from both the mother and father. The appellant in
Trimble was the illegitimate child of a man who had died intestate.
Appellant had received support payments from the decedent in accordance
with a court paternity order, which found the decedent to be appellant's
father. The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged statute could not "be
squared with the command of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."98
The Trimble Court again recognized the difficulties of proving pater-
nity, but concluded that "[d]ifficulties of proving paternity in some situa-
tions do not justify the total statutory disinheritance of illegitimate child-
ren whose fathers die intestate."99 In this case the Court found the
classification over-inclusive. It encompassed all illegitimate children, in-
cluding those whose paternity could be ascertained without burdening or
delaying the succession procedure. The Court found that the Illinois
statute failed to consider the possibility of a middle ground between
complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity.00 Al-
though a blanket exclusion could not be justified by problems of proof, the
Court held that certain classes of illegitimate children could permissibly be
denied the opportunity of proving paternity:
The States, of course, are free to recognize these differences in fashioning
their requirements of proof. Our holding today goes only to those forms of
proof which do not compromise the States' interests. This clearly would be
the case, for example, where there is a prior adjudication or formal acknowl-
edgement of paternity. Thus, we would have a different case if the state statute
were carefully tailored to eliminate imprecise and unduly burdensome meth-
ods of establishing paternity.' 0 '
Guidelines for developing a constitutional intestate statute are not
95. Id. at 536.
96. Id. at 538.
97. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
98. 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977).
99. Id. at 772.
100. Id. at 770-71.
101. Id. at 772 n.14.
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provided by the Court in Trimble. Although the Court appears to require
acceptance of a formal acknowledgement or prior adjudication as proof of
paternity, it does not say what other methods, if any, would be acceptable.
F. Effect of Lalli v. Lalli
In Lalli v. Lalli, 0 2 decided late in 1978, the constitutionality of the
New York intestate succession law 0 3 was attacked. The New York statute
permitted an illegitimate child to inherit intestate from his father only if a
court of competent jurisdication had issued an order of filiation declaring
paternity in a proceeding during the lifetime of the father and during the
mother's pregnancy or within two years of the child's birth. The appellant
in Lalli had not obtained a filiation order during the father's lifetime, but
did tender evidence of acknowledgement by the father.10 4 The Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the New York law.
Justice Powell, joined by two other Justices, wrote the plurality
opinion in Lalli. The level of scrutiny applied by Justice Powell appears to
differ from that applied in Trimble. Although Powell did make the state-
ment that the question was whether the statute bore "an evident and
substantial relation to the particular state interests this statute is designed
to serve,"'0 5 he also stated that the proper inquiry was "whether the
statute's relation to the state interests it is intended to promote is so
tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the Fourteenth
Amendment."'0 6 Another indication that different tests were applied in
Trimble and Lalli is that in Lalli the Court did not inquire into the feasible
alternatives available to the legislature. Justice Powell stated that "it is not
the function of a court 'to hypothesize independently on the desirability or
feasibility of any possible alternative' to the statutory scheme ... "'0'
Such an inquiry was proper according to the Court in Trimble.' 8
Whether or not Lalli represents a retreat from the Trimble middle
scrutiny test, Lalli does represent a change in the type of paternity proof for
which the state must provide in its intestate succession statute. According
to the Court in Trimble, recognizing both a prior adjudication of paternity
and a formal acknowledgement of the child by the father as sufficient proof
of paternity does not compromise the state's interests in the efficient
distribution of property. An intestate succession statute was unconstitu-
tional, according to Trimble, insofar as it did not provide for inheritance
by an illegitimate child who could prove paternity by either of these two
methods.'0 9 The appellant in Lalliwas denied the opportunity to introduce
102. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
103. 1965 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 955, § 1.
104. 439 U.S. 259, 262-63 (1978).
105. Id. at 268.
106. id. at 273.
107. Id. at 274.
108. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
109. 430 U.S. 762, 772 n.14 (1977).
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evidence of the decedent's acknowledgement of the appellant as his child,
and the Court upheld this denial. Justice Powell attempts to retreat from
the position taken in Trimble without overruling that decision. According
to Justice Powell, to read Trimble as requiring intestate succession statutes
to provide for both prior adjudication and acknowledgement ignores the
broad rationale of the Court's opinion and the context in which the
statement was made."0 The New York statute in Lalli was constitutional
even though it did not recognize a formal acknowledgement of paternity as
sufficient for intestate inheritance purposes, because, according to Powell,
"[a]ccuracy is enhanced by placing paternity disputes in a judicial forum
during the lifetime of the father.""' The states appear to be given much
leeway in developing acceptable methods of proving paternity for intestate
inheritance purposes.
In affirming the judgment below, we do not, of course, restrict a State's
freedom to require proof of paternity by means other than ajudicial decree.
Thus, a State may prescribe anyformal method of proof, whether it be similar
to that provided by [the New York statute] or some other regularized proce-
dure that would assure the authenticity of the acknowledgement. As we noted
in Trimble, such a procedure would be sufficient to satisfy the state's inter-
ests." 2
Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun joined the judgment in Lalli, but
for reasons other than those set out in Justice Powell's opinion. Justice
Rehnquist relied upon his dissent in Trimble, calling for a highly deferen-
tial review by the Court"' Justice Blackmun would have overruled Trim-
ble, and saw the Court reverting to the deferential principles of Labine.14
III. ILLEGITIMATES IN OHIO
A. Ohio Statutes
In Ohio, one can dispose of his property at death by making a will," 5
and there is nothing to prohibit one from including an illegitimate child in
the will. If a person does not make a will, section 2105.06 of the Ohio
Revised Code provides for the distribution of the decedent's property by
setting forth, in order of priority, those persons who are to take the
property. The "children" of the decedent are given the highest priority
following the decedent's spouse.'16 Illegitimate children are not included in
the term "children" as used in section 2105.06 except as provided in other
110. 439 U.S. 259, 274 n.11 (1978).
111. Id. at 271.
112. Id. at 272 n.8.
113. Id. at 276.
114. Id. at 276-77 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
115. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.01-.77(Page 1976).
116. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Page 1976).
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statutory sections. 17 Section 2105.17 of the Ohio Revised Code provides
that an illegitimate child can inherit from his mother as if he were a
legitimate child." 8 Thus the word "children" in section 2105.06 includes
illegitimate children when the decedent is the child's mother. The defini-
tion of "children," however, has not been similarly modified to include
illegitimate children when the decedent is the child's father. An illegitimate
child can inherit from the intestate father under section 2105.06 only if: (1)
the father adopts the child;' 9 (2) the father legitimizes the child by marry-
ing the child's mother;12 0 or (3) the father formally acknowleges, in probate
court with the consent of the mother, that the child is his.'
21
Ohio's bastardy statute122 provides a procedure by which the unmar-
ried mother of an illegitimate child can obtain support for the child from
the father. If the accused is found to be the father of the child, the court will
order him to pay for the support and maintenance of the child. 23 No
provision of the intestate succession statute, however, recognizes such a
finding as granting the illegitimate child the right to inherit from an
intestate father.
In sum, Ohio's statutory inheritance scheme provides for limited
inheritance by an illegitimate child from his father. Only when the father
has taken some affirmative steps during his lifetime to ensure such inheri-
tance can an illegitimate child take from the father's estate. The Ohio
statutory scheme does not provide any method by which the child can take
action before the father's death to guarantee inheritance, nor does an
illegitimate child have the opportunity to introduce evidence of paternity
in order to inherit from an intestate father after his death.
B. Green v. Woodward
The constitutionality of Ohio's intestate succession statute was chal-
lenged in Green v. Woodward,2 4 a court of appeals case decided in 1974.
The plaintiff in the case claimed that she was the illegitimate child of the
decedent and that she was entitled to a share of her father's property as if
she were a legitimate child. She had, however, been neither legitimated nor
formally acknowledged by the decedent. The Court of Appeals for Cuya-
hoga County found that the equal protection clause required all illegiti-
117. Ohio courts have held that unless there is some language in the statute itself that shows a
contrary intent on the part of the legislature, the word "child" or "children" means legitimate children.
See Miller v. Industrial Comm., 165 Ohio St. 584, 138 N.E.2d 672 (1956); Stakerv. Industrial Comm..
127 Ohio St. 13, 186 N.E. 733 (1933); Creisar v. State, 97 Ohio St. 16, 119 N.E. 128 (1917); Bonewit v.
Weber, 95 Ohio App. 428, 120 N.E.2d 738 (1952).
118. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.17 (Page 1976).
119. OfIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Page 1976).
120. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Page 1976).
121. Id.
122. Ouio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.01-.24 (Page 1976).
123. Ouxo REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.17 (Page 1976).
124. 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 318 N.E.2d 397 (1974).
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mate children be able to inherit intestate under section 2105.06, as if they
were legitimate, whether they inherited from the mother or the father.
125
The issue in Green, as stated by the appeals court, was one of intra-
class discrimination. When section 2105.17 was enacted granting illegiti-
mate children the right to inherit from their intestate mother, the state
included some illegitimate children within the definition of "children"
while excluding others. The Court stated: "We must determine whether the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution requires that once Ohio recognized some illegitimate
children as 'children' under R.C.§2105.06 the definition of'children' under
that statute includes all illegitimate children."
126
Levy, Glona, and Weber were not applicable, according to the appeals
court, because those cases were not challenges to intestate succession
statutes.127 Levy and Glona concerned the right of an illegitimate child to
bring a wrongful death action, 128 while Weber dealt with the right of an
illegitimate child to recover death benefits under a workmen's compensa-
tion statute. 12 9 Labine did concern an intestate succession statute, and at
first glance would appear to be the applicable precedent. 30 Nevertheless,
the appeals court found Labine to be inapplicable because it did not deal
with intraclass discrimination. The Louisiana intestate succession sta-
tute challenged in Labine barred illegitimate children from sharing equally
with legitimate children in both the father's and mother's estate and thus
discriminated between all legitimate children and all illegitimate children.
The Ohio statute, however, barred illegitimate children from sharing
equally with legitimate children only in the father's estate and not the
mother's.
The Ohio appeals court found the discrimination involved in Green v.
Woodward unconstitutional because it found "no reasonable or rational
relationship between the purpose of the statute and a classification that
permits illegitimate children taking only from and through the mother."'
32
The court rejected the idea that the statute should be upheld because
illegitimate children were not completely discriminated against since they
could be recognized and provided for by will, or could be legitimated by
adoption or acknowledgement. The court also rejected the rationale that
125. Id. at 117, 318 N.E.2d at 408.
126. Id. at 106, 318 N.E.2d at 402.
127. Id. at 111, 318 N.E.2d at 404.
128. See text accompanying notes 31-36 and 49-50 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
130. Trimble and Lalli, which also were challenges to intestate succession statutes, were not
considered because they had not been decided at the time of the Green decision.
131. 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 113, 318 N.E. 2d 397, 406 (1974).
132. Id. at 117, 318 N.E. 2d at 408.
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the problems of proving paternity supported the statute. In discussing this
problem, the court stated:
This argument can be overcome by requiring proof of paternity in such cases
by a high degree of proof such as clear and convincing evidence. Further,
among the things that can be considered by a court is whether there was a
determination of paternity by a court of competent jurisdiction within a
reasonable period of time after the birth of the child and prior to the death of
the father. 1
3
Thus it appears that the appeals court investigated possible alterna-
tives available to the legislature. By so doing, the appeals court was looking
for more than a rational relationship as it claimed. The appeals court not
only rejected the conclusion of Labine, but also rejected the level of
scrutiny applied in Labine.
Levy, Glona, and Weber may not have been as inapplicable as the
court originally implies-Levy and Glona because they too rejected the
challenged classifications, and Weber because the Court in that case also
investigated legislative alternatives.
C. Moore v. Dague
In the 1975 case of Moore v. Dague,134 the Court of Appeals for
Franklin County reached a conclusion opposite that reached in Green v.
Woodward. The plaintiff in Moore claimed that he was the illegitimate son
of the decedent. The decedent, however, had neither legitimated the
plaintiff nor acknowledged him as his son. As in Green v. Woodward, the
plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of the Ohio intestate succession
statute, claiming that illegitimate children were denied equal protection
under the statute.
The appeals court upheld the statute's validity, citing the Supreme
Court's decision in Labine as support. The intraclass versus interclass
discrimination distinction made by the appeals court in Green was found
to be unconvincing by the court in Moore. According to the court, the
Ohio statute did not create two classes of illegitimate children-rather, the
court based its holding on its views that all illegitimate children are treated
the same under the statute and that they can all inherit from the intestate
mother, and from their father if the father takes certain action.'35
Levy, Gomez, and Weber were distinguished from Labine and from
the case before the court. Those cases were concerned with the rights of
illegitimate children arising from dependency upon their natural parents.
The cases before the court in Moore and Labine dealt with the right of
133. Id. at 116, 318 N.E.2d at 407.
134. 46 Ohio App. 2d 75, 345 N.E.2d 449 (1975).
135. Id. at 80, 345 N.E.2d at 452.
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illegitimate children to inherit intestate-actual dependency was not an
issue. 136 The court concluded:
Thus, the court has expressly held that the state may not discriminate between
rights granted dependent children upon the basis of whether they are legiti-
mate or illegitimate. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has expressly
held that a state may grant rights of inheritance to legitimate children and
deny similar rights to illegitimate children and may create classes of illegiti-
mate children, with respect to the right to inherit from their natural par-
ents.
37
As in Green, the court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's
analyses in Trimble and Lalli since they were respectively decided two and
three years later. Trimble did find an intestate succession statute unconsti-
tutional.
The Moore court appeared to accept and apply the almost nonexis-
tent level of review applied in Labine, and rejected the middle level test of
Weber. The statute was afforded a presumption of validity, 38 requiring the
challenger to prove its unconstitutionality. The state's interest in eliminat-
ing spurious claims to the estate of a claimed natural father and in
minimizing the problems of proving paternity were discussed with appa-
rent approval by the appeals court.1 39 The appeals court also placed impor-
tance on the state's interest in the promotion of the family through the
marriage relationship. 140 This interest was accepted in Labine as sufficient
to support the challenged statute, but rejected by the Supreme Court in
Weber. The third interest considered by the appeals court in upholding the
validity of the challenged statute was the state's interest in reflecting the
presumed intention of the decedent. The appeals court's statements con-
cerning this interest demonstrates the low level of scrutiny employed, and
the extent to which the court deferred to the legislative judgment:
It is not the function of this court to describe whether the better rule would be
that illegitimate children have the right to inherit from their natural father or
that this would constitute the probable intent of a natural father not making a
will or otherwise providing for children. Rather, provisions for inheritance by
illegitimate children from their natural fathers is a matter that the court must
leave to the legislature and the natural fathers themselves. 41
The court concluded that it could "find no invidious discrimination rising
to constitutional stature in such classifications, since they express long-
time societal attitudes and the presumed intent of the natural father who is
free to provide otherwise."
1 42
136. Id. at 82, 345 N.E.2d at 453.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 85, 345 N.E.2d at 455.
139. Id. at 82-83, 345 N.E.2d at 453-54.
140. Id. at 84, 345 N.E.2d at 455.
141. Id., 345 N.E.2d at 454.
142. Id.
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In sum, it appears that, like the court in Green v. Woodward, Moore
rejected Weber and the test employed there, but that, unlike Green, the
appeals court applied the low level of scrutiny applied in Labine and
reached the same conclusion as Labine.
D. White v. Randolph
143
Clarence Jackson died leaving a will devising all his property to his
wife, but he failed to provide for disposition if his wife died before him,
which she did. The administrator of the estate brought an action to
determine the decedent's heirs-at-law. Alice Marie Jackson, who claimed
to be the decedent's illegitimate child, was joined as a defendant. 144 The
common pleas court held that Alice Marie was not entitled to inherit from
the decedent's estate because she was unable to introduce evidence to
demonstrate that the decedent legitimated Alice Marie, formerly acknowl-
edged her in probate court, adopted her, or designated her as his heir-at-
law. 145 Alice Marie appealed to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County
claiming that the equal protection clause requires that she be permitted to
inherit from her intestate father if she can establish that the decedent was in
fact her father. The appeals court upheld the common pleas court decision.
The Ohio Supreme Court accepted the appeal to resolve the conflict
between the decision of the Court of Appeals for Franklin County and the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in Green v.
Woodward.146 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the White
appeals court, adopting most of the language of the appeals court opinion
and making some additions.
The appeals court that heard White v. Randolph was the same court
that decided Moore v. Dague. Since the time of the Moore decision, the
United States Supreme Court decided Trimble, and the appeals court
wished to review its prior decision in light of Trimble.14 7 Thus, the appeals
court based its decision in White on Trimble and the cases leading to
Trimble. The appeals court decision in White, however, was reached
before the United States Supreme Court decided Lalli late in 1978. The
Ohio Supreme Court's decision, however, came after the Lalli decision,
and does consider its significance.
The prior controversy concerning intraclass versus interclass discrim-
ination did not concern the appeals court in White. The Illinois intestate
succession statute challenged in Trimble was open to the same intraclass
discrimination attack that concerned the appeals court in Green. The
143. 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, 391 N.E.2d 333 (1979).
144. Id. at 7, 391 N.E.2d at 333.
145. Id., 391 N.E.2d at 334. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (Page 1976); OHio REv. CODE
ANN. § 2105.18 (Page 1976).
146. 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, 6, 391 N.E.2d 333, 333 (1979).
147. Id. at 7, 391 N.E.2d at 333.
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United States Supreme Court, however, appeared not to be concerned
with the difference between the two types of discrimination. This lack of
concern in Trimble might have led the appeals court in White also to ignore
the difference and this lack of concern appears to be justified.
The appeals court in White assumes, without explaining how it
reached the assumption, that the statutory classification was designed to
further the state's interest in providing an efficient method of property
disposition at death. The appeals court was especially concerned with the
problem of proving paternity. Labine, Weber, and Trimble were relied on
to establish the state's interest in minimizing the problem of proving
paternity as a substantial state interest. In light of this state interest the
court found that, unlike the statutory scheme in Trimble, the Ohio law was
not overinclusive, and thus not unconstitutional. 148 The distinguishing
feature between the Ohio statutory scheme and the Illinois scheme chal-
lenged in Trimble was that the Illinois law excluded all illegitimate children
from inheriting intestate from their father. The Ohio law recognized at
least one way for an illegitimate child to inherit intestate from his father.
The court concluded: " 'In conformity with the dictates of Trim-
ble . . . the Ohio statutory provisions present a reasonable middle
ground for the recognition of certain categories of illegitimate children of
intestate men.' ,,149
It is not clear what level of scrutiny the court of appeals applied in this
case. Twice it stated the test in terms of the traditional rational basis test.
50
The appeals court focused, however, upon language in Trimble in which
the United States Supreme Court held the Illinois statute invalid because
the statute did not consider a middle ground between complete exclusion
and a case-by-case determination of paternity. 5 Thus, the appeals court,
by investigating alternatives available to the legislature, was probably
employing a higher level of scrutiny than the traditional rational basis test.
In its addition to the appeals court opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court,
when discussing the Lalli decision, stated the applicable test in terms of a
heightened level of scrutiny: " '[W]e conclude that the Ohio statutes in
question in the cause at bar are substantially related to the important state
interests discussed by the court in Lalli.' ,,9152
While, according to Trimble, the appeals court may have applied the
correct level of scrutiny, the conclusion reached is contrary to the Trimble
decision. Trimble recognized that when there was a prior adjudication or
148. Id. at 10, 391 N.E.2d at 335.
149. Id.
150. "'In the cases considering the general issue before us, it has been rather uniformly pointed
out that the rationality of the classification must be examined in light of the legitimate state purposes to
which it is related.' "Id. at 8, 391 N.E.2d at 334." 'Clearly, the Ohio classification scheme is rationally
related to the legitimate state purpose of assuring efficient disposition of property at death while
avoiding spurious claims.'" Id. at 10, 391 N.E.2d at 335.
151. Id. at 9-10, 391 N.E.2d at 335.
152. Id. at 11, 391 N.E.2d at 336.
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formal acknowledgement of paternity, the state's interest in the efficient
disposition of property at death was not compromised.153 Although Ohio
law provides for the possibility of a prior adjudication of paternity,15 4 a
prior adjudication does not necessarily grant the illegitimate child the right
to inherit intestate from the father. Ohio law, contrary to what the court
says in White, thus does not conform to the dictates of Trimble when an
illegitimate child has obtained a prior adjudication of paternity.
It should be noted, however, that the appellant had not obtained a
prior adjudication of paternity. Appellant was asking for the opportunity
to establish paternity with other evidence. 55 If the case had involved a
child who had obtained a prior adjudication of paternity, the court might
have reached a different conclusion." 'While we may envision situations in
which persons placed within certain statutory classes may be victims of
invidious discrimination, we do not believe that appellant has presented
such a situation under the Ohio statutes in the case at bar.' ,,156
Because the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lalli came
between the appeals court's decision in White and the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision, it would have been advisable for the Ohio Supreme Court
to write its own opinion, focusing more on the significance of Lalli. Lalli
does appear to support the validity of the Ohio statute. In Lalli, the United
States Supreme Court stated that a "state may prescribe any formal
method of proof, whether it be similar to that provided by [the New York
statute] or some other regularized procedure that would assure the authen-
ticity of the acknowledgement."' 157 While Lalli could be read as lowering
the standard of review, the Ohio Supreme Court attempted to apply a
higher standard and still reached the conclusion of validity.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Palmer in White emphasized the
fact that the Ohio statute provided no procedure by which an illegitimate
child could initiate a proceeding to secure parity in inheritance with
legitimate children.158 The only distinguishing feature found by Palmer
between the Ohio statute and the Illinois statute in Trimble was that Ohio
added one more method by which the father could recognize his illegiti-
mate child for purposes of intestate succession.159 Relying upon Trimble,
Justice Palmer would require the state to provide a middle ground between
complete exclusion and a case-by-case determination of paternity. A
153. 430 U.S. 762, 772 n.14 (1977).
154. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.01-.24 (Page 1976).
155. 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, 8, 391 N.E.2d 333, 334 (1979).
156. Id. at 10, 391 N.E.2d at 335. The court concluded" 'that the provisions of R.C. Chapter
2105, as applied to the appellant, do not constitute invidious discrimination under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Id. at 11, 391 N.E.2d at 335 (emphasis added).
157. 439 U.S. 259, 272 n.8 (1978).
158. 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, 12, 391 N.E.2d 333, 336 (Palmer, J., dissenting).
159. Id. The one additional method provided by Ohio law is a formal proceeding in probate
court, initiated by the father, to designate such child as his heir at law. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15
(Page 1976).
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middle ground approach, according to Palmer, appears only to be one that
permits the illegitimate child to initiate action to gain intestate inheritance
rights. By upholding a statute that permitted the child to gain inheritance
rights through a prior adjudication of paternity initiated by the child, Lalli
was seen by Palmer as simply recognizing the possible middle ground
required by Trimble.
160
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Ohio Supreme Court had difficulty correctly applying
the individual holdings of the United States Supreme Court, the conclu-
sion of constitutionality reached by the Ohio court is at least defensible in
light of the Lalli decision. This conclusion is dependent on interpreting the
Lalli decision as lowering the level of review employed in illegitimacy
cases, and, as a result, granting states greater leeway in the kinds of
paternity proof they will accept as valid. Application of the middle level
test found in Trimble, and the accompanying requirements concerning the
methods of paternity proof for which the state must provide, would appear
to invalidate the Ohio statute. Likewise, interpreting Lalli in a manner
similar to the interpretation of Justice Palmer in his White v. Randolph
dissent would result in the invalidation of the Ohio law. Indeed, the
question may hinge on whether the state must provide some method by
which the illegitimate child could initiate action before the father's death to
gain intestate inheritance rights.
It is clear that the state cannot completely prohibit intestate inheri-
tance by an illegitimate child. It is equally clear that the state is not required
to recognize all forms of competent evidence of paternity introduced after
the death of the father to gain a part of his estate. The state can place some
restrictions on the intestate inheritance of illegitimate children. The ques-
tion, however, remains as to exactly what restrictions are permissible.
Christopher D. Trail
160. 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, 13-14, 391 N.E.2d 333, 337. (1979).
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